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INTRODUCTION  
 
New Global Health initiatives, such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (GFATM), Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunisations (GAVI), UNITAID, 
J oint United Nations Program on HIV/ AIDS (UNAIDS), and foundations such as the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, have been critical to the increase in global health financing. 
From 2000  to 2010 , global health financing grew by 11.4 percent annually. Although this 
growth slowed from 2010  to 2015, global health financing is still high, with US$ 36.5 billion 
of financing disbursed in 2015. Some of the largest providers have been the US and UK 
governments (US$ 13.1 billion and US$ 4.1 billion, respectively) and the Gates Foundation 
(US$ 2.9 billion).1  
The bulk of health financing is administered through global health organizations, 
making them formidable players in  the field of global health.2 Much of the previous focus 
on these initiatives and organizations has been on their efficacy, but, as the editors of this 
Special Issue argue, the contribution of these global health organizations to advancing other 
normative areas, such as human rights, has been overlooked. This is particularly important, 
because we generally know that international organizations can shape important normative 
practices of actors, including states, at the domestic level.3   
In this article, we focus on the inclusion of human rights within the remit of the 
GFATM. The GFATM is a global health governance organization, which was established in  
2002 to disburse funds to developing countries to enable them to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, 
and malaria. Human rights have always been integral to this, as using a rights approach at 
the national level can tackle discrimination, which helps people to overcome barriers to 
contracting these diseases domestically, and enables states to create better access to 
services. Additionally, human rights approaches not only help to fight against 
discrimination and stigma but they can also contribute to improvements of social 
determinants of health, such as food, water, sanitation, housing, and education, all of which 
are essential in creating effective responses to these diseases. Consequently, the GFATM has 
sought to integrate human rights within its financing.  
Most states that receive GFATM funding are already signatories to numerous 
human rights treaties, which illustrates some willingness to integrate human rights norms 
within their health governance practices. However, evidence suggests that there is a still a 
lack of “sustained behaviour and… practices that conform to … international human rights 
norms.”4  
In this article, we want to understand the relationship between states and global 
health financing organizations and how they seek to advance human rights in their grant 
programs. We therefore ask: to what extent can global financing institutions shape human 
rights practices at the domestic level? The article uses the case study of the GFATM’s 
experience of adopting human rights as an institutional norm and analyzes the implications 
for the institution’s new role as a human rights actor within states. In particular, we argue 
that the institutional design of the institution impacts on the ability of the GFATM to 
substantively enhance human rights agendas within local health governance contexts.  
The article will proceed as follows: we first present a short history of the GFATM 
and its processes of integrating human rights concerns within its work. Through the 
application of sociological institutionalism in the following section, the article elaborates on 
the motivations and implications of the GFATM’s practices. The sociological 
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institutionalism framework can give us a better understanding of the implications of 
including new norms within global health governance institutions. The final section 
highlights the tensions between the primary aims of the GFATM as a funding agency, its 
obligations as a human rights norm entrepreneur, and how it has adapted in  these 
situations. Thus, we argue that the GFATM has had to adapt its institutional system in order 
to meaningfully promote a human rights agenda in global health governance, particularly 
at the domestic level. In the conclusion, we underscore the importance of institutional 
context for understanding the constraints and opportunities for attaining health-related 
human rights.  
 
ADOPTING H UMAN RIGH TS IN  TH E GFATM: MOTIVATION AND MECH ANISMS  
 
The GFATM is a public private partnership (PPP) and not a traditional international 
organization. PPPs are defined as “voluntary and collaborative relationships between 
various parties both State and non-State in which all participants agree to work together to 
achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities 
and benefits.”5 As a PPP, the GFATM relies on several UN agencies, which have specific 
expertise to help in the grant implementation process. These include three ex officio 
members without voting rights: UNAIDS, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the 
World Bank, which acts as a trustee to the GFATM. Other organizations—including the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations’ Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR), and the World Food Program (WFP)—all play distinct roles in ensuring 
health services are delivered to domestic contexts. These UN agencies have human rights 
obligations under international law and must bear some responsibility for human rights 
violations on GFATM funded programs.6  
As a PPP, the legal personality of the GFATM is ambiguous under international 
law. When international organizations have legal personality, they can conclude treaties, 
bring claims under international law, and be held responsible for violations of this law 
(including human rights violations). There is nothing in the GFATM bylaws, however, that 
indicates that its founders ever intended to give it these powers.7  
In this context, it is not party to the International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which enshrines the right to health. There is, however, a 
positive duty under General Com m ent No 14 for international organizations to cooperate 
effectively with States in order to realize the legal obligations that would enable them to 
maintain a right to health.8 This was the view taken in 2012 by the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to health, who argued that, international funders should ensure that their financial 
assistance enables countries to achieve the right to health. This is a positive duty and the 
onus still remains on the state to fulfill any human rights obligations. 
Benjamin Mason Meier noted the new era of normativity in global health that 
allows for consideration of human rights in how the GFATM works with states.9 This is 
manifested through the ways in which global health actors instigate new normative 
frameworks with the aim of transforming global health governance. Human rights norms 
are particularly attractive for these global actors because of their universal nature, as most 
countries have signed the nine core human rights treaties.  
From the GFATM’s inception in 2002, it was clear that it espoused human rights 
values of non-discrimination in its foundational documents.10  In 2008, the GFATM 
introduced a Gender Equality Strategy, and in 2009, it approved a Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identities Strategy as part of its burgeoning human rights strategies. These 
strategies demand that countries applying for financing illustrate how the grant attempts to 
address some of the human rights challenges of women and sexual minorities to create 
better responses to AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.  
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For any of this to work, it is worth examining how the GFATM understands its own 
role within the global health governance arena that it seeks to operate. In order to be eligible 
for grants, countries applying for GFATM programs submit proposals, which are reviewed 
by a panel of independent experts known as the Technical Review Panel (TRP) and are 
considered for approval by the GFATM Board. The TRP is a board of independent experts 
who assess the proposal for things, including potential for impact and soundness of 
approach. They look at human rights implications of the proposal as part of this process.11 
When the GFATM restructured its funding mechanism to include human rights, 
its aim was to ensure better human rights outcomes in funded projects and create more 
accountable forms of funding for health outcomes. This would include new stakeholders at 
the domestic level. These new stakeholders, Key Affected Populations (KAPs), are a central 
component of the new funding mechanism. As part of the new procedure for applying for 
funding, each country is given a fixed allocation of resources. The Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (CCM), which should have a wider number of participants from KAPs, is then 
tasked with engaging in a country dialogue process. This deliberative process aims to 
consider the epidemiological data, national health strategic plans and the past performance 
of health programs in  order to draft a concept note and budget. These are then submitted to 
the GFATM for consideration.12 The TRP reviews each country submission and may 
recommend that the country make changes to areas of the concept note in order to prioritize 
better the needs of the KAPs.13  
The GFATM has also hired evaluators who are conversant in human rights practice 
to ensure that members of the KAPs can meaningfully participate in the design, 
implementation, and monitoring of GFATM-funded programs. To make this possible, the 
GFATM Board provided US$ 15 million to support broader inclusion through greater 
representation when making concept notes. Furthermore, the GFATM tightened its rules, 
stating that greater participation of civil society and community groups as primary and sub 
recipients of grants would be essential to better service delivery and implementation of 
grants.   
The broadening of participation has been successful in some countries. For 
instance, in Morocco, the CCM now has a selection of 5 voting members (out of 33) to 
represent vulnerable and most-at-risk populations (the other two represent people living 
with HIV and affected by tuberculosis). Creating broader participation was particularly 
tricky in a country where there were no existing associations representing these groups, 
because homosexuality, prostitution, and drug use are all illegal. The successful 
incorporation of these groups was due to civil society involvement. 14 
The GFATM also stipulated minimum requirements human rights standards in  
Global Funded programs, particularly non-discriminatory access to services; respecting and 
protecting informed consent; confidentiality and the right to testing and treatment; the use 
of only scientifically sound and approved medicines and medical practices; not employing 
methods that constitute torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; and the use of 
medical detention only as a last resort. Furthermore, the GFATM also created more 
stringent mechanisms for reporting human rights violations.15 By creating these human 
rights strategies, and making it fundamental to its routinized practices, the GFATM has 
been pushing a human rights agenda within health funding for HIV/ AIDS, malaria, and 
tuberculosis.  
Yet, despite these many commitments, the PPP structure of the GFATM means 
that it is not an implementing organization, so it relies on the principle on country 
ownership, which transfers the role of implementation to domestic actors. This means that 
countries are supposed to drive the process of deciding their domestic health priorities, with 
the GFATM acting merely as a financing agent. This aims to make programs more 
sustainable. Many stakeholders, including donors, activists, and scholars, were critical of 
the fact that some countries who had received GFATM funding for HIV/ AIDS were 
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persisting with discriminatory laws and policies, which jeopardized AIDS-related programs. 
There were also serious concerns regarding the long-term sustainability of GFATM funding 
in countries where human rights were being routinely violated.  
So why has the human rights implementation been difficult in the context of this 
global health institutional configuration? In the following section, we consider the 
institutional contexts, and especially constraints, in institutional design that impact on the 
GFATM’s ability to influence domestic actors who also function within the global health 
institution. 
 
ADOPTING H UMAN RIGH TS: INSIGH TS FROM SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM  
 
New institutionalist theory understands institutions to be formal and informal “sets of 
m utual expectations between people, that have become more or less enduring, and that 
have crystalized into rule sy stem s.”16 The practices that determine the outcome of a 
particular institution’s policies are therefore determined by the routinized behaviors and 
actions that have been embedded as part of the design of the institution –  this is, its core 
identity.17 
Taking this definition of institutions for granted, the global health institution  
under consideration includes the GFATM, its funders, and the recipient states it funds.  
At the time of institutional design, the founders of the GFATM were mainly 
concerned with efficient financing mechanisms to recipient countries. Human rights were 
an additional consideration with regards to the efficiency and sustainability of this new 
mode of funding. If there was a normative element to the establishment of the GFATM, it 
was simply to establish the standards through which other global health organizations and 
initiatives could fund pressing health problems. There was an idea that it needed to deal 
with notions of discrimination, but the onus was really on other actors and states to achieve 
this. As part of institutional set up, the GFATM relied on CCMs for implementation and as 
the means to achieving local ownership.  CCMs include a wide range of stakeholders that 
prepare the funding application to the GFATM.18 The CCM is intended to ensure local 
ownership by designing health  initiatives that are most suited to local needs.19  
Health financing and local ownership may be considered the GFATM’s core 
organizational norms, since they serve as “standards of appropriate behaviour”20  
endogenously and exogenously in its relationship with states. Human rights are central to 
delivering this financing. In adding on this new norm, however, the GFATM is attempting 
to renegotiate the standards of appropriate behavior for actors within global health  
governance structures. In so doing, there is a direct attempt to change states’ behavior 
“through both instrumental choice and social learning to adhere to these new values.”21 
Further, this adoption of human rights norms raises expectations on the part of the states 
about the remit of the funder. 
Sociological institutionalism suggests that the way through which new norms 
become transposed is through institutional isomorphism. Institutional isomorphism is the 
process whereby institutions adopt new practices because it is seen as the right thing to do. 
Given the proactive discourse around the right to health in the ICESCR and in General 
Comment 14, the GFATM arguably had a moral obligation, as a health-related agency, to 
consider what human rights means for its own area of global health governance. However, 
as an international funder, how far should the GFATM go in assuming responsibility for 
human rights violations in its funded programs? 
While the introduction of new norms like human rights within the GFATM 
introduced new rules of appropriate behavior, there was no guarantee that other 
stakeholders would accept them, and we see some evidence of this later when we show how 
states challenged these norms through half-hearted compliance.  In other words, it is 
possible to deviate from the intended rules, as the ultimate duty-bearer of human rights 
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obligations remains the state party. For the GFATM’s aims to work, they needed to be fully 
accepted by the CCMs (in principle these are more inclusive than state parties, creating 
problems in implementation). Consequently, despite the efforts of certain actors (or agents) 
within the GFATM, there were gaps between norm commitment and compliance. 
In the past, this lack of compliance by states that receive global funding manifested 
itself through domestic human rights failures in implementing GFATM grants. For instance, 
despite several attempts to try and make the CCMs representative, in  order to ensure that 
the grants included suitable human rights initiatives for these groups, a 2010  survey of all 
the GFATM grants revealed that only eight percent of representatives on the CCMs came 
from people living with HIV/ AIDS.22 This failure was acknowledged by the then head of the 
GFATM, Michel Kazatchkine, who argued that, “the lack of support for programs that 
protect and promote human rights is one of the failures in the response to AIDS.”23 
 
The mismatch between the priorities of the actors within this institution, the 
GFATM, on the one hand, and the states on the other, can be explained by the 
actors within that institution.  It is assumed that:  
actors may be ‘rule makers’ but take existing rules as a starting point for defining 
their own identities and interests. Conversely, actors may also be ‘rule takers’, but 
nonetheless modify or even overturn those rules from time to time.24 
 
Institutionalization is a dynamic process that demands an understanding of the perspectives 
of all actors involved. In response to these failures that were critical to achieving effective 
grant implementation, the GFATM changed its grant model, explicitly committing to human 
rights in its 2012-2016 strategy.25 As a result, the GFATM now aims to i) integrate human 
rights considerations through the grant cycle, ii) increase investments in programs that 
address human rights-related barriers to access, and iii) ensure that the GFATM does not 
support programs that infringe upon human rights.26. By explicitly asking for the inclusion 
of human rights considerations within its programs, the GFATM was also demanding that 
its recipient states take human rights seriously. Increasingly, therefore, we see the role of 
the GFATM changing to that of a “gatekeeper,” creating a series of human rights safeguards, 
such as greater participation of key minority groups, or efforts to deal with discriminatory 
laws and policies, before it will allocate funding.  
The GFATM inclusion of human rights processes and procedures into the core of 
what the institution does can be thought of as institutional layering. Institutional layering 
refers to a process where new elements are attached to old processes, not with the intention 
of replacing the core elements of an institution but in addition to it.27 In this sense, whereas 
the GFATM is a funding initiative whose core aim is to fund and promote local ownership, 
it also champions the inclusion of human rights aimed at transforming the global health 
governance institution. In other words, it  promotes human rights consciousness from states 
in order to enhance local participation. 
According to Van der Heijden, layering is motivated by the desire to close the gap 
between intentions and outcomes.28 In the GFATM’s case, there are huge reputational costs 
for grants that are not complaint with human rights norms even though the obligation may 
be on the state party. Thus, the adding of extra human rights obligations on state parties 
enables the GFATM to realize its core aims and retain its legitimacy.  In doing so, the GFATM 
has contended with several challenges. In the next section, we explore the limitations and 
adaptations that the GFATM has engaged in as a means to promote human rights.  
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TH E CH ALLENGES OF ADOPTING H UMAN RIGH TS BY A GLOBAL INSTITUTION  
 
Although it has achieved a lot in terms of human rights, there are a number of constraints 
within the institution that make it difficult for the GFATM to achieve all its aims. First, 
organizations like the GFATM have often faced challenging institutional contexts, due to 
their reliance on donors and other UN agencies, which can have an impact on institutional 
capabilities. Second, the organization’s focus on local (country) ownership as a model of 
governance has made it difficult to implement human rights in practice. Third, the 
organization had to contend with the amorphous nature of human rights, which is at odds 
with its performance-based funding model. Last, we argue that human rights are holistic, 
which means that it is hard for an organization to fund some rights at the expense of others.  
 
Challenging Institutional Context 
 
As we discussed above, the institutional design of the GFATM means that it not an 
implementing agency, relying on its donors to finance it adequately and state parties and 
other UN organizations to implement grants, which distances it from human rights 
obligations. All the partners have different agendas, which can make it difficult to prioritize 
human rights norms sufficiently. However, as an organization, the GFATM bears huge 
reputational costs if there are human rights violations on any of its grants.  
For instance, in 2012, when human rights were introduced as an explicit norm of 
the GFATM, the institution also undertook a major restructuring, aimed at cutting costs, in 
order to try to appease its donors. This led to the departure of the executive director, Michel 
Kazatchkine. His departure precipitated the departure of many key personnel with human 
rights expertise and who had developed the gender and sexual minorities programmes.29 
This upheaval inevitably harmed implementation in many countries. Subsequently, the 
GFATM recruited new staff with longstanding expertise in human rights and introduced a 
Staff Human Rights Task Force.30  The reality of being a funding agency as opposed to an 
implementation agency means that staff lack the resources necessary to police human rights 
behavior in all 140  countries at the same time.31 To counter this, the GFATM has now given 
the Office of the Inspector General power to investigate human rights violations.32 In  
instances where the Inspector General cannot investigate, the GFATM can share 
information with the relevant UN agencies that may have a normative institutional mandate 
to investigate.33 
 
Reliance on Dom estic Partners  
 
The ability of an institution to implement human rights norms depends on states 
buying into the process. However, these states also must deal with competing interests from 
different stakeholders at the ground level, which makes it hard to use human rights to 
address inequality, as this approach often involves some redistribution of resources. A 
human rights focus that sticks to recognizing these vulnerabilities at the domestic level 
would be particularly problematic in countries where minorities, such as women in largely 
patriarchal societies, gay and lesbian groups, and drug users, are seeking rights that are 
currently enjoyed by the majority of citizens, as this often involves redistributing resources 
from the entrenched majority to minority groups. 
Because of these considerations, states often refuse to prioritize human rights 
considerations when applying for grants from the GFATM. Data from UNAIDS’ Fast-Track 
modeling illustrates that, in many instances, countries are simply not requesting funding 
for human rights interventions.34 Tinashe Mundawarara, who is with Zimbabwe Lawyers 
for Human Rights, explained the rationale behind this within the South African context, 
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arguing that “there is less appreciation of the need to cultivate human rights-based 
responses in  Southern Africa and, hence, less inclination to include them in proposals.”35  
The GFATM has, for instance, always tried to get the voices of minority groups in 
the application process of the grant, so that the human rights approaches countries apply 
are those that are most useful to communities. However, this process has sometimes been 
unsuccessful, and, even in those cases where the institution was able to attract more 
participants, this did not always translate to the prioritization of programs that focused on 
the specific human rights needs of people from KAPs.36 
Moreover, greater participation does not necessarily translate into greater human 
rights protection, especially in  health. Human rights participants and health professionals 
may have different agendas, and different human rights groups may also have different 
priorities for resource allocation.37 Human rights advocacy groups are not homogenous. To 
use an example, a women’s rights group may not automatically support the rights of female 
sex workers. Because the HIV/ AIDS epidemic affects women who contracted AIDS, often 
from their husbands, sex workers may be perceived as part of the problem. There is thus no 
incentive to work toward the same outcomes, and they may even work at cross-purposes.38 
This raises questions about the practicalities of effecting changes in  the context of existing 
domestic practice.  In response, the GFATM is increasingly funding programs to enable 
traditionally vulnerable groups to access information, health services, and treatment.39 
The GFATM has also tried to address the issue of repressive environments by 
creating spaces for these groups. For instance, the GFATM has arranged to fly 
representatives belonging to criminalized groups out of their home countries in order to give 
them the space to consult on human rights issues. This consultation period has been useful 
in raising awareness about the human rights issues of the LGBT population40  in some 
countries.41  
Other efforts to encourage participation include the introduction of alternative funding and 
targeted schemes to encourage participation of human rights groups. This includes funding 
for regional groupings, which has tended to focus primarily on issues affecting KAPs. For 
instance, in 2016, 15 Regional concept notes were submitted to the GFATM, which dealt 
with a diverse range of interventions, such as harm reduction for people who inject drugs, 
and the removal of legal barriers and supportive services for people with disabilities, and 
community system strengthening.42  
In these cases, the GFATM has also used its public role to reaffirm that the 
commitment to human rights is contingent upon improving legal, policy, and social 
environments that hinder the scale-up of effective responses to HIV/ AIDS, malaria, and 
tuberculosis. For instance, when Uganda passed its 2014 law on homosexuality, the GFATM 
was a vocal critique of these anti-discriminatory laws.  The GFATM decried the new 
legislation for providing “significantly tough[er] punishments against gay people” with 
“grave implications for public health”.43  This kind of signaling is important in  the 
promotion of human rights, as it adds to the universal understanding of what protections 
are necessary for minority groups in order to make the most of GFATM programs.  
 
The Problem  of Measuring Hum an Rights Effectiveness  
 
As a funding organization, the GFATM prides itself on its “results-based model”. 
This means that it only finances health initiatives whose results it  can measure. This focus 
on accountability by focusing on performance has been integral to its success as an 
organization. Its website proudly proclaims that the institution can measure impact in many 
ways, through the number of lives that are saved and the rate of decline in  HIV/ AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria. Under the new funding guidelines, the GFATM wants to see what 
it calls “smart programming that creates the strongest impact,” which refers to programs 
that reach the most affected populations.  
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When the institution approves a grant proposal, countries receive their 
disbursements in installments. Only when they have illustrated that they have performed 
adequately can they access the next disbursement.44  
Previously the GFATM relied on indicators that were not specific to human rights; rather, 
the focus was on measuring whether interventions worked.45 These were known as Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs). Unfortunately, these indicators took about 15 months to 
take effect. When finally approved in mid-2013, the KPIs of the GFATM consisted of 19 
indicators, three of them were strategic and 13 were activity-based, and these helped to 
assess the GFATM’s grants against the 2012-2016 Strategy.46 The Secretariat reported to the 
Board against these indicators twice a year.  The most closely related strategic objective on 
human rights was number 4, on promotion and protection of human rights. In response to 
this, the GFATM measured this criteria against its human rights investments.  
Some of the KPIs were criticized for not reflecting the challenges posed by the 
Fund’s strategy or not allowing corrective action when it was found necessary. For instance, 
strategic action 4.3 on integrating human rights considerations throughout the grant cycle 
was not measured with a KPI.47  Although a report of the Office of the Inspector General 
found that data collection on KPIs was generally good, even then, they were found by the 
OIG to be poorly designed, and not a good measure of the impact the Fund was having in 
the countries it supports.48  
In response to these concerns, on J une 15, 2017, the GFATM board launched the 
2017-2022 Strategic Key Performance Indicator Framework. A number of these indicators 
focus on human rights in relation to the Strategy.  KPI 5 tracks coverage of services for key 
populations, KPI 6 and 7 deal with resilient and sustainable health systems, and KPI 8 and 
9 deal with gender and age disparities and human rights barriers to access.49 Apart from 12 
KPIs that will measure the Fund against its strategic objectives, “the new implementation 
KPIs will track specific inputs, outputs and outcomes needed to meet those objectives; and 
the thematic reporting will provide results across the full results chain, drawing on financial, 
procurement, and programmatic data.”50   
 
The Realities of Funding a Lim ited Num ber of Rights  
 
As a funding institution, the GFATM’s focus is not extensive. Due to increasingly 
limited resources, it has a clear mandate about what it must fund. This in effect focuses on 
a narrow range of rights. However, it is difficult to separate human rights from the 
underlying determinants of health. For instance, to ensure that women get tested for 
HIV/ AIDS or malaria during antenatal health visits to counter discrimination, it is 
necessary to invest in  health centers, community awareness to enhance knowledge about 
services, labor protections that compel employers to give them adequate time off for  
antenatal visits, and transport services to easily access the health centers. Doing all this is, 
of course, expensive, and consequently unattainable as a practice of GFATM, despite its 
obvious benefits. Giving this link between the underlying determinants of health and the 
ability to shape human rights practice, some scholars have suggested that the GFATM would 
have to broaden from just three diseases and move toward becoming a “Global Health  
Fund.”51 The GFATM has tried to address this through the establishment of its new KPIs, 
which will move beyond focusing on specific projects to a more holistic approach, aimed at 
ending the three epidemics. Furthermore, the notion of “thematic reporting” will also help 
the GFATM to measure sector-wide progress, which includes other global health actors who 
are working toward similar aims at the country level.   
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CONCLUSION  
 
In this article, we have assessed the uptake of human rights as a norm of the GFATM. 
Although present in  the founding documents of the GFATM, human rights have developed 
as only a secondary norm of the GFATM. As the analysis shows, the secondary nature of 
human rights within the GFATM initially created challenges in the transposition of human 
rights norms within domestic contexts. Through the application of the sociological 
institutionalist framework of “layering,” we illustrated how the GFATM is countering states’ 
deviation from human rights norms by strengthening the conditional nature of its funding 
against much stricter human rights criteria that it wants to see in its grant applications. 
Furthermore, the GFATM now signs agreements with countries that include five minimum 
standards for human rights. Anyone who witnesses a human rights violation can report to 
the Office of the Inspector General, who has an obligation to investigate. These safeguards 
create much more stringent human rights standards that are prudent for the long-term 
survival of the GFATM, because the increased accountability embedded in its institutional 
design exposes it to increased scrutiny. The success of these new norms remains to be seen 
in practice.  
However, the low percentage of resources spent on human rights against total 
GFATM funding still illustrates the secondary nature of the human rights norm. In 2016, 
the GFATM was spending approximately 2.3 percent of AIDS funding on human rights 
initiatives.52 This is still very low, and in order to be more effective, this would need to rise 
substantially. Arguably, this will be a tough sell for its donors, especially in an environment 
where there is a push back against global responses to health problems. However, human 
rights remain a normative good, and so cannot be discarded. Indeed, the work of the 
GFATM will remain crucial to ensuring that human rights is mainstreamed as part of health 
governance in its recipient countries.  
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The  Wo rld Ban k an d Th e  Righ t to  H ealth :  
A Study o f th e  In s titu tio n ’s  Righ ts -Bas ed Dis co urs e  
 
Yusra Ribhi Shawar and J ennifer Prah Ruger 
 
 
W hile the W orld Bank has integrated rights-based principles in the im plem entation of 
som e health program s that it finances, it continues to deny  a form al legal obligation for 
hum an rights. Em ploy ing them atic and discourse analy ses, this study  analyzes the w ays 
in w hich rights-based approaches are incorporated into W orld Bank health developm ent 
discourse, exam ining achievem ents, obstacles, and opportunities. W e describe the 
evolution of hum an rights discourses in the W orld Bank’s health engagem ent, beginning 
at the tim e of its establishm ent before it w as form ally  involved in health sector lending. 
W e find five key  institutional factors that challenge the advancem ent of rights-based 
approaches in the W orld Bank’s health w ork: unresolved legal obligations stem m ing from  
the institution’s founding docum ents, the W orld Bank’s econom ist-dom inated culture, its 
staff’s lack of know ledge about hum an rights application and policy , opposition by  som e 
country  stakeholders, and com petition w ith em erging developm ent banks. Despite this, 
there are three opportunities for integrating right to health approaches w ithin the W orld 
Bank: internal research activity  supporting hum an rights com m itm ents in developm ent, 
pressure exerted by  NGOs and civil society  through their m onitoring of the institution, and 
the establishm ent of the Nordic Trust Fund, w hich serves to increase staff aw areness of 
hum an rights and its application to their w ork. Given the W orld Bank’s historical legal 
resistance to a rights-based approach, w e end by  arguing for an ethical dem and for health 
equity , w hich m ay  be effectuated by  a policy  fram ew ork rather than a legal “right to 
health” approach.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Over the last several decades, the World Bank has played a central role in global health 
development lending and practice and is increasingly recognized as a prominent global 
health governance leader.1  While the Bank  has had an impact on the health of those 
residing in low and middle-income countries (LMICs),2 it  is also  critiqued for its human 
rights record. Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights, has proclaimed the World Bank to be a “human rights free zone”;3 an 
estimated 3.4 million people were economically or physically displaced by Bank-funded 
projects between 2004 and 2013;4 and individuals affected by Bank-funded interventions 
report not feeling safe to ask questions or express their feelings about the impacts that 
World Bank projects have on their well-being.5 
The Bank’s human rights discourse, however, is neither clear-cut nor well 
understood. There are instances where World Bank health programming and policies are 
perceived as fundamentally supporting or detracting from a rights-based approach. On one 
hand, the Bank is committed to improving the wellbeing and health of the poor in LMICs, 
given its pledge to help countries achieve universal health coverage and as reflected in its 
“twin goals” of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity, which contribute 
to the realization of social and economic rights. On the other hand, the Bank is historically 
resistant to adopting a formal rights-based framework due to guidelines laid out in the 
institution’s founding documents, which explicitly prohibit the institution from meddling in  
a state’s internal political affairs.   
We examine the Bank’s rights-based discourse in its engagement with global health 
over time. While the World Bank was absent in  global health efforts in  the first several 
decades following its establishment, it presently manages an active Health, Nutrition, and 
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Population (HNP) portfolio of $11.5 billon,6 has been the world’s leading funder of 
programming and policies that address HIV/ AIDS,7 and plays one of the most significant 
roles in  global health cooperation.8  An understanding of the Bank’s “right to health” 
discourse is critical given its pivotal role in the global governance of health and in its 
determination of health investments, institutional developments and policies of LMICs, and 
the broader global health agenda.  
We begin by discussing the origins and meaning of a “rights-based” approach, 
considering the implications that a commitment to a “right to health” might have in practice 
for the World Bank before describing the methodology employed in this study. We then 
describe the evolution of right-based approaches in the Bank’s health discourse and analyze 
the factors that present opportunities for  advancing rights-based approaches in the Bank, 
as well as those that have historically challenged its institutional advancement. We conclude 
by arguing that the World Bank’s embrace of an ethical demand for health equity, rather 
than the pursuit of a rights-based discourse, will better  enable the Bank to deliver improved 
health development outcomes, given that such a reconceptualization transcends the 
identified challenges that persistently impede institutional advancement of rights-based 
approaches. 
 
METH ODOLOGY 
 
Fram ew ork for Understanding the “Right to Health” 
 
The “right to health”—enshrined in the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization (1946), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1976), and the Declaration of Alma-Ata (1978), among other formal documents—is 
understood as “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.”9 It is both a freestanding right and constitutive of other rights, 
given that its realization is a precondition to the enjoyment or definition of rights related to 
various types of economic, political, social, cultural, and civil rights.10  Practically, a rights-
based approach to development seeks to ensure that human rights criteria (i.e., 
affordability, accessibility, acceptability, quality, and availability) and principles (i.e., 
accountability, participation, non-discrimination, sustainability, and access to information) 
are accounted for during the course of development.11 In addition, rights-based approaches 
support rights-holder capacity to claim their human rights and duty-bearer ability to meet 
their responsibilities. 12  We accounted for these criteria, principles, and obligations in our 
analysis of the World Bank’s “right to health” discourse. 
 
Data and Analysis 
 
We adopted a two-level case study methodology of the World Bank and its HNP 
Department. Unlike quantitative methodologies, the case study method is ideal for this 
research question given that we seek to study a complex social phenomena, have no 
possibility of controlling the events that unfolded, and are interested in answering “how” 
and “why” questions.13 In order to minimize bias and increase the validity of our findings, 
we triangulated across various sources of data that were drawn from different sources and 
at different times.14 This included archival data, World Bank strategies and reports, peer-
reviewed literature, as well as relevant reports and statements from the media, NGOs, other 
international organizations, and civil society monitoring World Bank activity. We also 
conducted semi-structured interviews with key-informants within the World Bank: from the 
Legal Department, Nordic Trust Fund, and the HNP Department.  
Employing thematic and discourse analyses, this study analyzed the ways in which 
rights-based approaches are incorporated into World Bank health development discourse, 
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examining achievements, obstacles, and opportunities. We constructed a historical 
narrative of key events and conducted a discourse analysis15 of relevant Bank statements 
and formal strategies by analyzing the conscious and unconscious agendas and meanings of 
selected texts. We also undertook a thematic analysis16 of the collected data. We used an  
iterative process in  developing the codes,17 with the coding evolving as additional data were 
collected.  Initial codes for analyzing global health discourse at the World Bank were based 
on the identified human rights criteria (affordability, accessibility, acceptability, quality, 
and availability) and principles (accountability, participation, non-discrimination, 
sustainability, and access to information). This enabled us to examine how discourse 
derived from World Bank publications, speeches, and decisions reflected the Bank’s rights-
based actions and policy decisions (or lack thereof) in its health policies and programming. 
Initial codes for analyzing the factors shaping the opportunities and challenges for the 
Bank’s rights-based progress were based on a policy determinant framework,18 which 
describes five general types of factors that are hypothesized or have been found to influence 
implementation outcomes: 1) characteristics of the implementation object (in this case, 
human rights); 2) characteristics of the user/ adopter (the history, internal policies, and 
culture of the World Bank); 3) characteristics of the end users (the nation states and 
populations affected by World Bank intervention); 4) characteristics of the context (the 
global political and policy environment, including the actions, policies, and strategies of 
other international financial institutions, international organizations, and NGOs); and 5) 
the characteristics of the strategy or other means of facilitating implementation (the 
research conducted, legal opinions crafted, and entities/ policies constructed internally by 
the World Bank that are relevant to human rights). 
 
TH E EVOLUTION OF RIGH TS-BASED APPROACH ES IN  W ORLD BANK D ISCOURSE 
 
The W orld Bank’s Governance, Establishm ent, and Early  Years (1945-1960s) 
 
An understanding of the World Bank’s rights-based discourse in  health requires 
an examination of the institution’s governance and establishment, well before its 
engagement in  health lending. Established in J uly 1944 and beginning operations in 1946, 
the World Bank’s original goal was to finance the post-war European country economy, 
focusing on large physical capital and infrastructure projects. A specialized agency of the 
UN, the World Bank Group is composed of five “member institutions”. The largest of these 
institutions are the International Bank for Reconstruction (IBRD), which offers loans to 
middle-income countries, and the International Development Association (IDA), which 
offers concessional loans and grants to the world’s poorest developing countries. Both 
institutions share the same leadership and staff and have a mandate to assist development 
efforts in their member states. The World Bank’s 189 country shareholders are represented 
by a Board of Governors, which is composed of member countries’ ministers of finance or 
ministers of development.19 These governors delegate specific duties to the Bank’s Board of 
25 Executive Directors (ED), who are responsible for selecting the President for a five-year, 
renewable term and approving all institutional loans and policies.20  ED designations are 
based on member state financial contributions  (e.g., the United States is represented by one 
ED, while forty-seven sub-Saharan African countries are collectively represented by only 
two EDs).21  
At its establishment and over the first couple decades of its existence, the World 
Bank was explicitly resistant to considering human rights. As stipulated in its Articles of 
Agreement, the institution’s founding documents, the World Bank saw itself as an economic 
development agency and clearly forbid the institution from intervening in any country’s 
internal political affairs or engaging in decision-making based on political considerations.22 
Article VIII, Section 5(f) of the Articles of Agreement states that:  
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The Bank, its President, officers and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs 
of any member, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political 
character of the member concerned. Only economic considerations shall be 
relevant to their decisions. Such considerations shall be weighed impartially in 
order to achieve and carry out the purpose and functions of the Bank.23  
 
The World Bank’s unwillingness to uphold principles of human rights in its policies and 
lending practices became particularly evident in the 1960 s, when the institution decided to 
–  in defiance of a series of UN resolutions –  approve several loans to Portugal and South 
Africa, despite their respective colonial and apartheid policies.24 The World Bank 
overlooked the human rights violations occurring in these countries and cited its apolitical 
character for its decision to move forward with its loan support.25  
 
The W orld Bank’s Increasing Engagem ent in Politics and Interest in  Health (1970s) 
 
Robert McNamara’s presidency (1968-81) marked several unprecedented shifts in 
World Bank policy –  having direct implications on its health  and human rights discourses. 
Under his leadership, the Bank moved from project to policy-based lending,26 began 
venturing into areas of social development that aimed to improve the health and well-being 
of LMIC populations, and became centrally engaged in areas of national politics and law 
that historically were understood to be outside of the scope of its Articles of Agreement (i.e., 
the promotion of “good governance” as critical to development),27 recognizing that such 
“political” efforts were fundamental to ensuring the success and sustainability of 
development initiatives. Despite these transformations, the World Bank resisted 
acknowledging a formal link between political and civil rights, economic development, and 
good governance.28  
 Two policy areas and one approach –  population, environment, and basic needs 
respectively –  emerged during this time and served as precursors to the World Bank’s 
involvement in health. We examine how developments in each of these areas reflected and 
shaped the institution’s right to health discourse. 
The World Bank’s Population Projects Department (PNP) began operations in 
September 1969 and provided the Bank’s first population loan to J amaica in  1970 .29  As 
noted by Dr. Kanagaratnam, PNP’s first director, the Bank decided to enter the population 
field primarily because “it became convinced that the attempt to raise living standards in  a 
great many developing countries was being seriously undermined by population growth.”30 
Instead of advancing a population agenda because of a concern for the intrinsic sexual and 
reproductive rights of women in LMICs, the Bank’s involvement in this area was largely 
instrumental: seeking to “achieve fertility decline in the quickest and most effective way 
consistent with the realization of national socio-economic development objectives.”31 
The Bank’s interest in the environment also developed during the 1970s. The 
relationship between the Bank’s development initiatives, the environment, and the health 
and well-being of the populations that were impacted was of particular concern to the 
appointed environmental advisor, Dr. J ames Lee.32 He drew attention to the traumatic 
effects that Bank supported projects were having on indigenous populations in LMICs. Dr. 
Lee’s concern and outside NGO pressure to address the situation ultimately led the Bank to 
develop a tribal policy and practical handbook, which member countries resisted because it 
infringed upon their sovereign rights regarding their people.33 
In 1976, the basic needs approach (BNA) in development emerged, introduced by 
the International Labor Organization’s World Employment Conference,34 and was rapidly 
taken up by the World Bank because historical policy approaches that focused on 
maximizing GNP per capita were not facilitating the automatic “trickle down” of economic 
growth to the poor.35 BNA, which promotes the satisfaction of basic material needs for food, 
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material, health, shelter, etc. before moving on to other “higher” needs, was seen as a means 
of directly addressing poverty reduction among the most vulnerable populations.36  An 
approach that continues to dominate development discourse, some scholars characterize 
BNA as a forerunner to the human rights approach (HRA). However, there are several 
fundamental differences: BNA focuses on inputs and meeting needs, while HRA focuses on 
processes, outcomes, and realizing rights; BNA addresses proximate causes of problems, 
while HRA addresses structural causes; and in a BNA, individuals are “objects of 
development interventions” and “deserve assistance,” while in  HRA, individuals are 
“empowered to claim their rights” and are “entitled to assistance.”37   
 
Establishm ent of the Health, Nutrition, and Population Departm ent (1980 s –  m id-1990s) 
 
Health became a formal area of institutional focus in October 1979 with the 
establishment of the Population, Health, and Nutrition Department, which was ultimately 
renamed as the Health, Nutrition, and Population (HNP) Department.38  A background 
paper for the 1980  World Development Report39 identified five factors that led to the World 
Bank’s increased interest in and commitment to health, one of which was a concern for 
human rights and meeting the basic needs of the poor that arose in the mid-1970s.40  In fact, 
the World Bank’s lending in health and the social sector broadly and also its incorporation 
of poverty reduction strategies are cited in  Bank publications as major contributions to 
advancing social and economic rights in LMICs.41   
However, the Bank’s motivation for health lending was also largely instrumental. 
As described by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group, its involvement in health 
was expressed as a means to an end, rather than an end itself (e.g., an intrinsic concern for 
population rights), given that the institution sought to improve HNP outcomes in order to 
increase poor productivity and national economic growth.42 Furthermore, HNP’s 
establishment and early years coincided with the advancement of three Bank-wide policies 
that represented a fundamental derogation from a rights-based discourse: the promotion of 
structural adjustment lending, user fees, and privatization. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Bank compelled countries to implement 
structural adjustment policies.43 At the time, the Bank believed that structural adjustment 
would lead to poverty reduction through trade liberalization, increased competition from 
the private sector, and devaluing of overvalued currencies.44 In reality, between 1980  and 
1992, world debt rose from $0 .5 trillion to $1.2 trillion, with many of the countries adopting 
structural adjustment policies shouldering the greatest debt.45  Moreover, the policy led to 
growing health inequalities and disrespect for the human rights of LMIC populations,46 
resulting in half a million young children dying over a one year period. 47 
At around the same time, the World Bank highlighted user fees, which involves 
levying a fee for using public sector health services, as an instrument for mobilizing 
resources.48 Research concerning user fees has since revealed that the policy resulted in a 
decline of service utilization, especially among women and socioeconomically deprived 
populations.49 Despite the World Bank claiming that it does not support user fees in  its 1997 
sector strategy,50  many NGOs and health experts continue to blame the World Bank for its 
introduction, advancement, and failure to put out a policy that rejects its use.51 
Finally, privatization in World Bank policies began growing during this time. 
Loans with privatization as a condition tripled between 1990  and 2002, despite the World 
Bank advancing that it does not force privatization on the poor.52 Critics expressed concern 
about the negative effects that the institution’s backing of privatization was having on LMIC 
health,53 since successfully working through private-sector providers necessitates intricate 
health information systems and administrative capabilities that a majority of LMICs 
typically lack.54 Privatization also promotes the fragmentation of the health system, which 
makes a state’s implementation responsibilities more difficult and “complicates oversight 
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and the promotion of a rights-based approach to health.”55 In fact, private healthcare 
institution aims often diverge considerably from human rights principles.56  
 
The W olfensohn Era: A Shift in Hum an Rights Discourse (m id-1990s –  m id-2000s) 
 
Under the leadership of President J ames Wolfensohn (1995-2005), the World 
Bank increasingly became one of the world’s largest global HNP financiers, with annual 
commitments of $1.3 billion in 1999.57 Despite making significant contributions to health 
services and policies across the world and becoming a central actor in global health policy 
debates,58  it was also increasingly critiqued for undermining rights-based principles in  its 
health initiatives. For example, the DALY (disability-adjusted life year), a measure of overall 
health and life expectancy of different countries, was introduced by the World Bank in 
1993,59 and was widely criticized for violating rights-based principles by discriminating 
against the disabled, young, and elderly, as well as women and future generations.60  In 
addition, the rights-based criteria and principles of quality and accountability were 
perceived to be undermined, since the World Bank’s Operation’s Evaluation Department 
concluded that only 64% of HNP projects were satisfactorily completed between 1975 and 
1998, with most of health projects insufficiently “defining and monitoring progress toward 
HNP development objectives” and accounting for and addressing health determinants 
generally.61 Also, the Bank’s health work was insufficiently open to outside scrutiny, 
detracting from rights-based principles of access to information and accountability, given 
that as of 1998, there had only been two reviews commissioned externally by the Bank of its 
health activities.62   
Despite these critiques, Wolfensohn’s presidency catalyzed unprecedented 
discussion on human rights more broadly within the World Bank. For example, his 
appointment coincided with the early years of the Inspection Panel, established in 1993. The 
Panel investigates –  when prompted –  the World Bank’s compliance with its own 
procedures and policies as a means to safeguard people and the environment impacted by 
its projects.63  Because it  empowers those marginalized by World Bank projects, the 
Inspection Panel forced the institution for the first time to confront and address cases that 
raised human rights concerns. Several Panel decisions concerning underlying determinants 
of health have highlighted instances in  which World Bank procedures and policies may 
necessitate the Bank to account for human rights issues.64 These cases have directed the 
institution to: consider the wider consequences of human rights violations, not just when 
they have a direct economic effect on the project;65 evaluate a country’s general state of 
human rights and governance when planning and carrying out its projects;66 and account 
for the human rights protections covered in a country’s constitutions or laws and ensure 
that institutional funding does not violate a country’s international human rights 
commitments.67 
A second key development during Wolfensohn’s tenure was the legal opinions of 
General Counsels Ibrahim Shihata (1983-2000) and Roberto Dañino (200 3-2006), which 
created the legal space for the institution’s engagement in topics that were once considered 
too political and recognized the relevance of human rights within the World Bank’s 
development work.68 Both recognized that the “Articles of Agreement permit, and in some 
cases require, the Bank to recognize the human rights dimensions of its development 
policies and activities.”69  
Dañino and Shihata also advanced that the World Bank may help a country realize 
its own human rights legal obligations (in the instance that it communicates such a desire), 
given that these commitments “have an economic impact or relevance,” and that the Bank 
should take human rights into consideration when “a country has violated or not fulfilled its 
obligations” –  again in the instance that they have an economic impact.70  However, Dañino 
went further in an internal legal opinion that he distributed on his last day as General 
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Counsel, advancing that the World Bank should disengage in “egregious situations, where 
extensive violations of human rights reach pervasive proportions” –  no longer requiring an 
economic impact justification.71  His legal opinion, however, would have little impact. Given 
long-standing disagreements about human rights among Bank staff and leadership, the 
opinion was not presented to the Bank’s Board of Directors, representatives in the Legal 
Department were reluctant to discuss it openly among themselves, and the succeeding 
General Counsel Ana Palacio (2006-2008) interpreted it as permitting but not requiring the 
Bank to act in relation to human rights.72  
The World Bank’s 1998 publication Developm ent and Hum an Rights: The Role of 
the W orld Bank,73 which  commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, also signaled an increasing institutional recognition of 
human rights. The report recognized that national growth requires some respect for human 
rights, human rights progress in the World Bank should be measured by the extent to which 
economic growth occurs with increased citizen realization of economic and social human 
rights, and that the institution should support the human rights goals of the United Nations, 
its parent organization.74  While human rights advocates considered the report’s message to 
be “good for public relations but devoid of practical effect,”75 a growing collection of World 
Bank research emerged subsequent to its publication that advanced a link between the 
promotion of civil liberties and rights and stronger economic performance.76  Also, 
subsequent to the report’s publication, Wolfensohn circulated a proposal for a 
Comprehensive Development Framework to World Bank staff, calling for a  “holistic 
approach to development” that acknowledged the protection of “human and property 
rights” and a comprehensive framework of laws as critical for equitable development.77  
 
The Present: The W orld Bank’s “Right to Health” Discourse (m id-2000s –  present) 
 
Over the last decade, there has been renewed optimism, as well as pessimism, 
concerning the World Bank’s progress in advancing rights-based approaches in health as 
reflected in several recent developments.  
One of the greatest points of optimism for the advancement of rights-based 
approaches in the Bank was the establishment of the Nordic Trust Fund (NTF) in 2009. 
Originally proposed in 2006, it was created with contributions from Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Germany as an internal “knowledge and learning initiative” 
to assist in showing Bank staff how human rights relate to their work and goals.78  To 
overcome initial opposition from the Bank’s leadership,79 lawyers working on the trust 
funds’ plan of action strategically advanced an instrumental approach to rights and a focus 
on pilot projects instead of advocacy for an institution-wide human rights policy.80  Totaling 
$34.8 million, the NTF educates World Bank staff about human rights issues and provides 
Bank teams, through a grant program, the financial and technical support to examine the 
role of human rights in their work. Several of the 122 grants supported by the NTF have 
explicitly sought to advance “right to health” discourse at the Bank by examining the 
operationalization of gender in  health, considering what a human rights approach can offer  
maternal and reproductive health projects, and producing standards of practice that add a 
human rights perspective in adolescent sexual and reproductive health projects.81  
Representing “a break from the Bank’s past leadership,”82 J im Kim’s appointment 
as World Bank president in 2012 also created optimism among many global health and 
human rights advocates. Unlike past Bank leaders that have typically been experts in  
finance, economics, or politics,1 Kim is a clinician and anthropologist, with extensive 
humanitarian global health experiences as the co-founder of Partners in Health, and was 
                                                 
1
 J ames Wolfensohn was another exception; he was a lawyer by training. 
94   SHAWAR & PRAH RUGER, THE WORLD BANK AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
 
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, VOLUME XII, NO. 1 (SPRING 2018) HTTP:/ / WWW.GHGJ .ORG 
previously a major critic of the World Bank.83 Despite expanding the institutional 
boundaries of the World Bank’s mandate84 and being outspoken in his rhetoric concerning 
the “right to health,”85 human rights proponents argue that Kim’s advancement of 
institutional discourse on human rights has fallen short.86  
Some of the criticism toward Kim is associated with the World Bank’s revision of 
its safeguard policies, which he oversaw and made official on August 4, 2016. While the 
newly approved Environmental and Social Framework (ESF)87 explicitly references human 
rights in its overarching vision statement, its language presents human rights as aspirational 
values and is non-binding –  excluding any human rights commitments and standards.88 In 
addition, the new policy effectively shifts responsibility and liability for harms away from 
the Bank and onto borrower countries that often lack the political will, as well as the 
financial and technical ability, to ensure that monitoring and/ or grievance mechanisms 
operate effectively to protect vulnerable populations.89  Also, the new ESF shifts much of the 
World Bank’s due diligence on projects until after they are approved.90  Despite these 
criticisms, ESF incorporated some important reforms to the previous ad hoc and 
burdensome policies, such as requiring stakeholder engagement throughout the project 
lifecycle and placing greater focus on strengthening borrower frameworks and capacity 
building.91 In  fact, one of the ten Environmental and Social Standards (ESS) explicitly 
addresses the “health, safety, and security risks and impacts on project-affected 
communities” (ESS4), with special attention to vulnerable populations.92  
During the development of the ESF, the World Bank’s human rights reputation 
was significantly tainted by its handling of the Uganda Transport Sector Development 
Project (UTSDP). In 2015, the Bank initially dismissed problems reported by the community 
related to community safety, sexual violence, child labor, and insufficient compensation for 
those who lost land to the project. 93 Of particular concern was the sexual abuse and 
exploitation of women and children in the community by unmonitored project construction 
workers, resulting in an increase in  unintended pregnancies and women contracting 
HIV/ AIDS. The Inspection Panel ultimately initiated an investigation,94 prompting the 
Bank to eventually cancel the project, suspend all new lending to the government of Uganda, 
and institute remediation measures.95 Especially concerning to human rights and health 
advocates were: the Bank’s failure to account for the local context and accordingly classify 
the risk of the project appropriately, its initial denial and slow response to serious 
allegations raised by the local community, and the Bank’s absence of a systematic method 
for providing support to the individuals impacted by the project.96  
Finally, the World Bank’s recent support of governments to achieve universal 
health coverage (UHC) is favorable to the advancement of institutional rights-based 
approaches 97 given that UHC may be viewed as rooted in the right to health, as set out in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.98 In  support of UHC 
targets in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3, the World Bank has committed $15 
billion over the next five years to undertakings fundamental to UHC.99  Despite this 
commitment to UHC, the World Bank is accused of undermining the human right to 
universal health care given its promotion of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in health.100 
A 2016 Independent Evaluation Group report on healthcare PPPs found several problems 
with the ways in which the Bank has implemented PPPs in  the health sector. Especially 
concerning was little evidence demonstrating that PPPs actually helped improve access to 
health services for poor communities.101 In addition, human rights advocates are concerned 
with the Bank’s approach to  universal healthcare coverage, which involves the creation of 
health insurance schemes that allow people to access healthcare facilities, but that works 
through insurance schemes that are typically only available to people working in the formal 
sector (not the most marginalized individuals in LMICs working in the informal sector).102  
These advocates prefer  a policy of universal healthcare provision, which dictates that a 
government guarantees the provision of healthcare services to all, irrespective of income 
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and status. Finally, critics raise concerns with the impact that the Bank’s blanket promotion 
of performance-based financing has on advancing UHC, given some emerging evidence that 
it does not necessarily improve the practice of health workers and the performance of health  
facilities.103  
 
FACTORS SH APING W ORLD BANK RIGH TS-BASED D ISCOURSE IN H EALTH  
 
The World Bank’s right-based discourse in its global health initiatives is shaped by several 
institutional factors.  Five institutional factors have historically challenged a World Bank 
commitment to the issue. A principal barrier to human rights integration in the World Bank 
is the Articles of Agreement. The World Bank’s founding member countries purposefully 
restricted its mandate to economic activities as a means to protect country sovereignty. By 
explicitly prohibiting the World Bank’s engagement in political activity, the Articles of 
Agreement have historically thwarted the Bank’s involvement with human rights, which 
have been understood as “political considerations.” Interpretation of the Articles, which is 
determined by a majority vote among the Executive Directors, have not altered with respect 
to engagement with human rights issues even as various legal counsels have taken no issue 
with the World Bank’s engagement with political issues such as governance, corruption, 
citizen security, justice, and the rule of law.104 Human rights—of all the political issues that 
the World Bank engages in—continues to be classified as “political” rather than economic. 
Furthermore, the human rights taboo continues to be “policed” within discussions in the 
Executive Board and the broader institution by the Legal Department.105 
A second factor challenging human rights mainstreaming concerns the World 
Bank’s institutional culture, which is dominated and largely influenced by an economist 
perspective. Economists occupy most senior management positions and their way of 
thinking reigns, influencing how institutional goals are crafted and justifications articulated 
within the institution.106 From an economist perspective, rights are “perceived as being 
rigid, anti-market, and overly State-centric.”107  Accordingly, there is an uneasy tension in 
balancing the World Bank’s inherent aim of efficiency (swiftly designing and implementing 
projects with little obstructions and impediments) and an explicit commitment to human 
rights (making these projects participatory, transparent, etc.). This institutional culture has 
challenged incorporation of human rights into the World Bank because doing so “forces 
employees into a struggle between principles and pragmatism, creating a tension between 
normative, intangible values and goals, and practical ways to solve problems.”108 
A third factor challenging the World Bank’s engagement with human rights is the 
lack of knowledge that staff have concerning human rights application. As reported by the 
NTF Progress Report, “World Bank teams…are not well informed about how human rights 
could be applied in their work…and are uncertain about how human rights can help provide 
better concrete answers . . . .”10 9 Evidence of this lack of knowledge was substantiated in an 
internal 2009 survey, which revealed that World Bank staff see human rights as relevant to 
their work but are uncertain how to integrate human rights in their work. Specifically, the 
survey found a staff knowledge gap around the definitions, laws, institutions, and standards 
governing human rights.110  While a 2013 follow-up survey found some improvement in staff 
knowledge and awareness of human rights,111  the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme 
poverty and human rights has noted the persistence of this challenge: “Human rights are 
not well understood by a great many officials within the Bank. They have a passing 
acquaintance, but no real sense of the overall picture.”112 
A fourth factor impeding the World Bank’s engagement with a rights-based 
approach is country resistance. While some key World Bank stakeholders are supportive of 
a formal policy on human rights, other countries such as China strongly oppose it.113  Some 
countries oppose the World Bank’s engagement in human rights on the grounds that it 
interferes with state sovereignty, while others resist it because they already face challenges 
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with gender equality and/ or accounting for the existing, basic governance indicators 
required by the World Bank.114 These countries are concerned that a rights-based approach 
at the World Bank would expose their human rights records and require them to undertake 
rigorous assessments as part of the loan process. In  addition, some member countries 
believe that a formal World Bank endorsement of human rights could result in  demands for 
political “democracy” that could threaten non-democratic governments and unnecessarily 
destabilize states lacking democratic institutions.115 Relatedly, there are some within the 
Bank that advance that a human rights discourse needs to be avoided because the World 
Bank is already viewed as commanding Western values and interests on non-Western 
countries, and that a human rights discourse would further complicate existing 
sensitivities.116  
The final challenge to adopting rights-based principles concerns the World Bank’s 
emergent rivalries from other development banks that are increasingly being supported by 
its traditional backers.117  These new multilateral investment banks (e.g., the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, both launched in 20 14) 
and emergent national development banks in  countries such as Brazil, China, and India 
currently do not have the same social standards as the World Bank. Accordingly, there are 
rising suspicions and legitimate fears that the World Bank will increasingly be swayed from 
integrating human rights requirements in their lending in  order to remain competitive and 
be perceived as the most efficient institution, with the fastest speed of fund disbursement 
and least project requirements offered to country borrowers.118 
Despite these challenges, three factors are likely to support the World Bank’s 
future engagement in rights-based approaches in its health initiatives. The first is the work 
of the NTF, which sidesteps the World Bank’s lack of institutional policy on human rights 
by improving project-level rights protection. Although NTF cannot lobby for official World 
Bank policy changes, it provides an important platform to increase awareness about human 
rights and to showcase the application of a rights-based approach in projects within the 
organization. This can be an important catalyst in expanding acceptance for and 
operationalization of human rights policy at the World Bank. 
A second factor is the continued NGO pressure on the World Bank to engage in 
human rights principles in  its work.119  The World Bank’s development of its initial 
safeguard policies in the 1980 s is largely attributed to the pressure that NGOs applied.120 
Presently, organizations such as Human Rights Watch, the International Consortium of 
Investigative J ournalists (ICIJ ), the Bretton Woods Project, and the Bank Information 
Center serve as important accountability mechanisms by monitoring and reporting on the 
negative impacts that some World Bank projects have on the human rights of certain 
populations. By uncovering the adverse impacts that some World Bank projects have on 
human rights, these NGOs not only contribute to improvement of the institution’s existing 
accountability mechanisms (i.e., the Inspection Panel and the safeguard policies), but they 
also help create the evidence for considering an alternative, more sustainable channel of 
accountability: an explicit institutional commitment to human rights. 
Finally, the growing body of research within the World Bank that concerns human 
rights represents a potential opportunity for greater World Bank engagement. Some of this 
research comes out of the World Bank’s Development Research Group, which has published 
studies on the use of legal strategies in bringing about social change and achieving economic 
and social rights,121  the determinants of compliance with human rights treaties,122 the 
relevance of human rights indicators for development,123 and the benefits, risks, and 
limitations of human rights-based approaches to development.124 This research builds on 
studies conducted by the World Bank in the past, which have found large and statistically 
significant effects of civil liberties on investment project rates of return.125 Collectively, this 
work provides important evidence for the institution to consider a stronger commitment to 
human rights in its operations.  
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D ISCUSSION  
 
Despite growing recognition of the relevance of human rights to its work, the World Bank 
continues to lack systematic and formal integration of rights-based approaches into its 
health policies and programming. The World Bank’s evolving engagement with rights-based 
discourse is fundamentally shaped by a deep-seated friction between its legal obligations, 
as set out in the Articles of Agreement, and its changing practical mandate, as reflected in  
the goals and type of health work that it pursues. While the institution’s NTF, its monitoring 
by NGOs, and growing research supporting human rights commitments in development are 
promising for better integrating rights-based approaches in  the World Bank’s health work, 
five key institutional factors persist in challenging its advancement: unresolved legal 
obligations, the institution’s economist-dominated culture, its staff’s lack of knowledge 
about human rights application and policy, opposition by some country stakeholders, and 
competition with emerging development banks. 
Given the World Bank’s historical legal resistance to a rights-based approach, we 
argue for an ethical demand for health equity, which may be effectuated by a policy 
framework rather than a legal “right to health” approach. A rights-based approach is often 
understood within a legal framework, with a delineation of responsibilities based on legal 
commitments and liability for satisfying the rights of individuals through judicial 
processes.126 In contrast, an ethical approach demarcates requirements based on moral 
obligations and accountability for ensuring justice and equity for individuals and 
populations. 
While the judicialization of the right to health has been promoted by some scholars 
as a means to secure better health outcomes for the most marginalized,127 we argue that it  is 
an insufficient and ineffective means to promote health equity at the World Bank. For one, 
legal right to health approaches are critiqued for regularly not empowering individuals, as 
intended, and contributing to or reinforcing paternalistic practices.128 Because human 
rights are considerably dependent on existing societal power relations, human rights 
systems have historically benefited those with the most power.129 In fact, male-dominant 
understandings of human rights are mainstream, and states ultimately hold legal power 
over people.130  Accordingly, powerful actors, including financial institutions such as the 
World Bank, are prone to reinforce the status quo in their pursuit of “rights-based” 
approaches,131 especially since the most marginalized communities are either out of reach 
or lack the power to effectuate legal, rights-based approaches. 
Second, and relatedly, legal right to health approaches often may unintentionally 
deepen existing inequalities for access to healthcare.132 For example, right to health 
litigation in Brazil has compromised the advancement of health equity because it  disregards 
resource restraints that can only be supported at the cost of universality. Accordingly, only 
a small number of individuals are granted this unlimited right to any benefits –  over the rest 
of the population. Furthermore, health inequity is perpetuated where it is often the most 
privileged communities that are the ones that access the judiciary, an accessibility that 
marginalized communities (whose health conditions are comparatively worse and who have 
less than adequate access to other social determinants of health) typically do not possess.133 
Third, right to health approaches tend to be top-down and one-size-fits-all in  
nature.134 In practice, they often pay insufficient attention to circumstantial social, political, 
and historical conditions and tend to generalize.135 In fact, right-based approaches are 
critiqued for often detracting from implementation “when policy making becomes an end 
in itself and does not follow its operationalization in a culturally sensitive manner.”136 
Accordingly, we contend that an ethical demand for health equity—rather than a 
legal demand for a right to health—will better enable the Bank to deliver improved health 
development outcomes, given that it is in line with the Bank’s political economy perspective 
and transcends the identified challenges that have persistently impeded institutional 
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advancement of rights-based approaches.137 In line with its political economy lens, the 
World Bank is designed to implement structural interventions to advance ethical demands 
for health equity –  interventions that change finances, incentives, and power systems often 
well beyond the health sector.138 Furthermore, the World Bank is in the best position to 
effectuate policy—rather than legal changes—given its significant engagement with and 
influence on policymakers in LMICs, representing various ministries.139 Finally, application 
of an ethical approach to health equity is in accordance with current World Bank reforms 
and initiatives. This includes the NTF, which is prohibited from advancing legalistic right-
based modifications to Bank policy, but has been instrumental to creating normative change 
in the institution by building knowledge and best practices around the incorporation of 
right-based principles in the institution’s programming. Relatedly, the World Bank’s 
implementation of its new Social and Economic Framework—a policy, not legal, 
framework—will be instrumental to advancing ethical, rather than legal, demands for 
health. 
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In te rn atio n al H e alth  As s is tan ce  an d H u m an  Rights  in  Eth io pia 
 
Hiwote Fantahun 
 
 
This article exam ines the responsibility  of external funders to ensure respect for hum an 
rights in  their health assistance in highly  repressive and politicized countries, using 
Ethiopia as a case study . Ethiopia’s experience is particularly  instructive, as it is highly  
dependent on international assistance for health, and ruled by  one of the m ost repressive 
regim es in the w orld today . International assistance, even though has played a vital role 
in im proving health outcom es in Ethiopia, has been a tool to discrim inate am ong 
populations based on their political affliction, as revealed by  research findings on m ajor 
W orld Bank-adm inistered program s. Bank safeguards w ere inadequate to prevent or 
detect such discrim ination. The article recom m ends that health program  funders consider 
countries’ enabling legal and policy  environm ent as a m ajor factor in their funding 
decisions, recognizing the im portance of a holistic approach to hum an rights to protect the 
right to health. 
 
 
Ethiopia is one of the top recipients of international health assistance, yet also one of the 
world’s most repressive countries.1 The question, then, is whether—in such a repressive 
regime—health assistance can be provided in a way that is not undermined by the political 
repression. The answer, at least for Ethiopia, is that it cannot. This commentary 
demonstrates how health aid is politicized, and how donor approaches to accountability are 
insufficient in Ethiopia, and, indeed, undermined by donors taking a technical rather than 
political framing to the issue. Yet, there are steps providers of assistance could take to lessen 
the risk of aid being misused. 
 
H UMAN RIGH TS AND RIGH T TO H EALTH  IN ETH IOPIA 
 
Ethiopia has ratified major international treaties recognizing civil, political, and socio-
economic rights.2 The Ethiopian constitution obliges the government “to allocate ever-
increasing resources for public health and other social services with equal access to every 
citizen.”3 Yet, domestic legislation that runs counter to international and constitutional 
human rights obligations of the state serve the government as a tool to crush dissent, 
suppress freedom of expression, and frustrate human rights-related work in the country.4  
 
INTERNATIONAL H EALTH  ASSISTANCE  
 
From emergency food aid to agricultural imputes, from primary education to building 
government institutions, aid to Ethiopia is an endeavor worth billions of dollars. 
International health assistance has played a vital role during the past two decades in helping 
Ethiopia improve health outcomes.5 Even though the total national health expenditure has 
increased, government’s contribution is declining, substituted by international health 
assistance.6 
International cooperation is sanctioned by international human rights law.7 These 
instruments do not explicitly state the nature of this duty, although principles governing 
extraterritorial obligations require, at the very least, that it should not contribute to 
impairing people’s rights.8  This commentary focuses on non-discrimination and 
accountability, two core principles of the right to health, in  relation World Bank-led multi-
donor projects that have been implemented in Ethiopia over the past ten years. 
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International Health Assistance: Discrim ination  
 
In 2014-2015, Ethiopia received US $3.6 billion in Official Development 
Assistance, a quarter of which was allotted for health.9 The World Bank’s contribution ($0 .8  
billion) for the same period is the highest of any funder, followed by that of the United States 
($0 .7 billion) and the United Kingdom ($0 .5 billion).10   The Bank plays an important role 
in setting the framework for donor engagement through its country partner strategy (CPS), 
and in administrating their contributions to joint programs.    
Among active multi-donor programs led by the World Bank is the Promoting Basic 
Services (PBS) program. The PBS, now in its third iteration (which runs until J anuary 2019), 
was first approved in  May 2006.11 PBS was established partly with the objective of 
preventing “a reversal in gains made in human development (through) delivery of critical 
basic services to the poor…in the midst of political governance and macroeconomic 
fragility.”12  The program annually transfers an average of $1 billion to the federal 
government in block grants. Projects under this program, designed to support the delivery 
of service in the agriculture, education, health, and road sectors, are implemented 
nationwide.  
  A second World Bank-led project, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP4), 
launched in 2005 and running until 2020 , providing regular food or cash transfers to food 
insecure households in  chronically food insecure districts benefiting more that 8  million 
people.13  The program channels on average half a billion dollars to the government 
annually.  
Human Right Watch have published a series of investigative reports that outline 
how the Ethiopian government utilizes PBS, PSNP4, and other similar programs as political 
weapons to control the population, punish dissent, and undermine political opponents. 
These reports record systemic exclusion of people from accessing emergency food aid, 
agricultural imputes, and farmland based on their real and perceived political 
membership.14 
The PBS also supports Ethiopia’s flagship health extension program, paying the 
salaries of the 38,000  community health workers who go door-to-door to deliver health  
services such as immunization; malaria, TB, and HIV prevention and control; family 
planning; and civic education.15  These workers receive mandatory political instructions 
from the ruling party two evenings per month.16 More disturbingly, perhaps, allegations of 
discriminatory population control through long-acting contraceptive and deceptive 
sterilization targeting the ethnic Amhara women are becoming frequent. The region, which 
is predominately inhabited by the Amhara, arguably the most politically disfavored group 
under the current regime, exhibits the highest uptake of contraceptives of all the nine 
regions of the country, other than the capital city Addis Ababa.17  Scholars are calling for a 
thorough and impartial investigation to the allegations.18  
 
International Health Assistance: Accountability   
 
Monitoring and evaluations mechanisms implemented for the PBS focus mainly 
on administrative and financial aspects of accountability. The 2008-2011 World Bank 
country assistance strategy introduced social accountability mechanisms to improve the 
interface with government.19  The Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group concluded that 
such schemes are of limited impact in the context of restrictive laws governing the media 
and civil society.20  
The World Bank implements social and environmental safeguards with the 
objective of preventing and mitigating undue harm to people and their environment in 
development processes. The current safeguards are concerned with forests, pest control, 
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dam safety, natural habitat, involuntary resettlement, and indigenous people. However, 
only the indigenous people safeguard has an explicit human rights policy objective.21 
 In September 2012, 26 representatives from the Anuak community in the 
Gambela region challenged the PBS III before the World Bank Inspection Panel.22  They 
claimed that the World Bank is responsible for forceful eviction from their land by PBS-
sponsored Ethiopian government officials. The Panel vindicated the Bank of wrongdoing, 
affirming that the eviction was conducted under a separate government villagization 
program, which happens to run concurrently with PBS III. The Panel, however, recognized 
the failure of the program to trigger the Bank’s applicable safeguard on protecting the rights 
of indigenous peoples at the appraisal and during implementation of PBS III. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The World Bank monetary and technical assistance to developing countries is of vital 
importance to economic progress and human development. Yet, respect for fundamental 
human rights is a necessary condition for development.  
Despite a decade of double-digit economic growth, Ethiopia is unable to 
adequately feed several million of its people. The government’s brutal response to citizens’ 
attempt to exercise their civil and political rights often results in destruction of resources 
and livelihoods, putting social development gains at risk of reversal. PBS was a reaction 
from the international donor community to prevent such setback in the aftermath of the 
landmark 2005 national election. A decade later, Ethiopia is currently experiencing similar  
unrest, which has already claimed hundreds of lives.23  
The World Bank should thoroughly incorporate human rights into its social 
safeguard mechanisms. Such mechanisms would enable the Bank to assess national laws 
and policies in terms of the Bank’s ability to operate in a manner that is consistent with 
these universal obligations. For example, the introduction of Civil Society law by the 
Ethiopian government has not only unduly limited freedom of association but also the 
integrity of the social accountability mechanisms implemented by PBS.24 Human rights 
safeguards would have led the Bank to pressure the government to revise such legislation, 
or discouraged passing it in the first place. If international assistance providers continue to 
support the Ethiopian government with no mechanism to challenge its human rights 
records, their actions will contribute to continuing, deepening repression in the country. 
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